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The English Law Commission: A New
Philosophy of Law Reform'
R. 1. Sutton*
Mr. Sutton discusses the newly formed English Law Commission
in an effort to present constructive suggestions for the establishment
and maintenance of effective law revision programs for other jurisdictions. He examines the structure of the English commission and points
out that the qualities of flexibility, independence, and opportunity for
early compromise of its proposals with legislators are essential for a
successful law revision commission. The author concludes that the
major value to be gainedfrom the English commission is its adoption of
a new philosophy of law reform-give the commission sufficient latitude
to enable it to stimulate advanced legislation.

Lawyers in the British Commonwealth are becoming increasingly
concerned about the need for an official agency which can accomplish

law reform.2 The law has many shortcomings. They are debated in

legal writings, at professional conventions and at local law society
meetings where complaints are made by law practitioners. There is a

gap, however, between agitation and reform. Probably nothing will
come of the proposals for change unless somebody undertakes the
task of investigating the complaints, refining the proposals to a
point where they can properly be translated into law, and then submitting these proposals to the appropriate authority. Is there an
agency that effectively performs that function? Should it go beyond

the investigation of complaints, and initiate a comprehensive program
of reform?
The English Law Commission was established in 1965 with the

express duty of reforming English law.3 The initiative came from the
* Lecturer in Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand; Frank Knox Memorial
Fellow, Harvard Law School, 1967-1968.
1. Grateful acknowledgments are due to Dr. Gareth Jones of Trinity College,
Cambridge, and Visiting Professor at the Harvard Law School, 1966-1967, who supplied basic materials which have been of the greatest assistance in the preparation
of this article.
2. See, e.g., Goodhart, Law Reform in England, 33 AusTL. L.J. 126 (1959); Megarry,
Law Reform, 34 CAN. B.R. 691 (1956). See generally Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice,
35 HAuv. L. Env. 113 (1921); Stone & Pettee, Revision of Private Law, 54 HARv. L.
REv. 221 (1940).
3. Law Commissions Act 1965 c. 22 (establishing separate law commissions for
England and Scotland). See Chorley & Dworkin, The Law Commissions Act, 1965,
28 MOD. L. REv. 675 (1965); cf. Heineman, A Law Revision Commission for Illinois,
42 ILL. L. REv. 697 (1948); MacDonald, The New York Law Revision Commission,
1009

1010

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VoL.. 20

Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, who, prior to his appointment, had
sharply criticized the previous arrangements for achieving law reform.4
In his view, the pace of reform had been much too slow. A radical
change was necessary if the law was not to fall far behind what was
required of it under modern conditions. Noteworthy features of the
Commission, which immediately distinguished it from its predecessors,
were its formal constitution by legislation, its full-time members, its
control of a full-time staff, and its responsibility for a planned
program of law reform.5 But beneath these apparent differences lay
something much more important-an entirely new philosophy of law
reform. The task of shaping the common law, which had for so
long been in the hands of the legal profession, was in a large measure
to be taken away from them. New, contemporary values were to be
infused into the traditions of the law. In the words of the chairman
of the Commission, "inmany respects law reform is too serious a
matter to be left to the legal profession." 6 The purpose of this article
is to examine some of the implications of this new philosophy in
relation to the structure, functions and effectiveness of the Commission.
In making this examination, useful comparisons can be drawn with
a law revision commission established in New Zealand shortly after
the English Commission had been set up. The New Zealand Minister
of Justice had also become unhappy about the way law reform had
been carried out in his country.7 The solution he proposed, however,
was conceived along much more traditional lines. It was based upon
the notion of a partnership between the various bodies which would
normally be involved in the making of law, that is, the legal profession,
university lawyers, the legislature and the Department of Justice.8
Representatives of all these bodies were to play a part in the activities
undertaken by the new Commission. The New Zealand Commission,
therefore, involved not so much a shift in the responsibility for law
reform, as a new and improved technique aimed at ensuring that
existing responsibilities are fulfilled.
28 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1965); MacDonald & Rosenzweig, The Law Revision Commission
of the State of New York: Its Organization, Procedure,Program and Accomplishment,
20 CORNELL L.Q. 415 (1935); Schientag, A Ministry of Justice in Action, 22 ConNML
L.Q. 183 (1937).
4. LA-w REFoR Now 1-14 (G. Cardiner & A. Martin eds. 1963) (hereinafter
cited as Gardiner & Martin); of. Th Rromi OF =im LAW 9-21 (G. Williams ed.
1951) (hereinafter cited as Williams).
5. Law Commission Act 1965 c.22, §§ 1,3.
6. Scarman, The Role of the Legal Profession in Law Reform, 21 RECORD Or
N.Y.C.B.A. 11, 12 (1966).
7.

J.

HANAN, THE LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY-A POLICY AND PnOGnARME FOR

LAw REonm (1965).
8. Id. at 20-25. For the establishment of the proposed Commission, see N.Z. DLp"r
OF JusncE ANN. REP. 1965-1966 at 18 (1966).
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It is by no means clear whether a commission of the English type
is in fact the best way of bridging the gap between dissatisfaction
with particular rules of law and their eventual reform. Indeed, it
would be presumptuous to suggest that there is any one "best way"
when law reform agencies exist in states and countries where the
common law and professional attitudes towards it are in very different
stages of development. However, there are certain questions which
can usefully be asked. What reasons appear to have led the English
Lord Chancellor to the view that a radical break with the past was
necessary, while his New Zealand counterpart came to the opposite
conclusion? What structure does the independent English Commission have, and how is its independence likely to affect its chances
of achieving specific reforms? Finally, what impact is the new
philosophy of law reform to have on the program of reform undertaken by the Commission? These are matters that deserve the most
serious consideration before the English Commission can be held up
as the model law reform commission of the future.
I. LAW REFORM BEFORE

=m COMMISSION

What factors influenced the Lord Chancellor in adopting a new
philosophy of law reform? It seems that much more was involved
than his own personal predilections. An examination of the recent
history of law reform in England suggests that two matters in particular would call for close scrutiny in any review of existing law reform
arrangements. They were (1) the comparative lack of productivity
of the only agency which had an overall responsibility for reform of
the general law, and (2) the existence of certain entrenched attitudes
within the profession which seemed, at least to more liberal critics,
inimical to the development of a modern system of law. A comparison
with the corresponding situation in New Zealand, where much less
concern was expressed on these matters, tends to confirm the impression that they weighed heavily in the Lord Chancellor's calculations.
The Law Revision Committee, appointed early in 1934, was the
first official agency in England specifically devoted to the general
reform of the law. When it went into recess at the outset of World
War II, it had produced eight reports, on seven of which the legislature subsequently acted. In 1952, the Law Reform Committee was
established, with the same functions. That Committee produced
fourteen reports, seven of which have so far resulted in legislation. 9
9. Wade, The Machinery of Law Reform, 24 MOD. L. REv. 3 (1961). The appendix
to Professor Wades article contains a list of the Committees' reports and consequential
legislation.

For subsequent work, see LAW REF om CoMMTrEE, NiNTiREPoRT,

CMD. No. 1268 (1960) (liability in tort between husband and wife); LAw RiEoRm
CoMimrr=rrn, TENTH REOnRT, Cam. No. 1782 (1962) (remedies for innocent misrepre-
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This does not, however, give a fair idea of law reform activities in
England during the period. Two "permanent" committees had been
set up to deal with reform of criminal law and private international
law respectively, on a continuing basis. A fair number of committees
concerned specifically with one reform had also reported.10 Moreover,
it would be unwise to judge the committee solely on the number of
reforms effected, without regard to their legal and social importance
and the general state of obsolescence of the law with which they dealt.
In fact, many of the committees' reports dealt with matters of great
legal difficulty, and they are to be credited with some important
reforms. I"
Nevertheless, the critics of the status quo had a great deal of
ammunition at their disposal. Many anomalous features of English
law still remained. 2 Large areas of law had been allowed to grow,
without overall direction, and were ripe for re-examination, yet nothing
was being done. Furthermore, the committees were "representative"
in the sense that their members were purposely drawn from the
various branches of the profession-from the judges, the barristers, the
solicitors and the academic lawyers. 13 This gave ground for doubts
whether such a committee could carry out this large task.' 4 Would
its part-time members be able to devote sufficient time to it? Might
not a body in which barristers and judges were so predominant be
unduly hampered by established professional attitudes? And, above
all, how could one hope for a comprehensive and consistent system of
law when so many different bodies were responsible for its reform?
In New Zealand, on the other hand, the last twenty years of law
reform were considerably more successful, at least in the view of
sentation); LAw REFoPm Com.nvrE, ELEvENTH RPOEPORT, CiN. No. 2017 (1963)
(damages for loss of services of servant, wife or child); LA-w RExonm CoM~nmrF-,
TwEr.Lr BzoRT, CMD. No. 2958 (1966) (transfer of title to chattels); LAw RFOnm
CoMMrITE,
THEmENm REPoRT, Czm. No. 2964 (1966) (hearsay evidence in
civil proceedings); LAw REFoR
CoMiMnTE, FouTEmn- REPORT, Cmn. No. 3100

(1966) (acquisition of easements and profits by prescription).
10. For details of the work of the ad hoe committees, see Wade, supra note 9,
app. pt. 2. The reasons for the successes and failures of some of them are analysed by

Goodhart, supranote 2.
11. Notable examples are the principles of contribution between joint tortfeasors
and contributory negligence. These must surely now have daily application in the
courts. See Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935, 25 & 26 Gco. 5,
c. 30; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, 8, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 28;
LAw REVms
CoMwzn-TEE, THIR REPonT, CMD. No. 4637 (1934); LAW RE, sioN
Commrrran, EmsTu REPoRT, CMD. No. 6032 (1939).
12. See LAw CoMmissioN, FIRST PRocnAwnm 13-14 (1966).
13. See Wade, supra note 9, app. pt. 1. The committees were heavily weighted
on the side of court lawyers. For example, in 1960, the Law Reform Committee
comprised five Supreme Court judges and law lords, five practising barristers, tvo
solicitors and three academic lawyers.

14. See 258 PAR,. Dn., H.L. (5th ser.) 1087 (1964); Gardiner & Martin 2-7;
Chorley & Dworkin, supra note 3, at 681.
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those associated with reform in that country 5 The reasons for this
sense of achievement are of some importance to the present enquiry.
There seem to be four significant factors. First, although a law
revision committee was set up in 1936 along the same lines as the
English Law Revision Committee, its practice was very different. It
preferred to consider a large number of lesser matters, rather than
to concentrate on a few major ones.' 6 The major studies it did undertake were delegated to very small subcommittees. 17 Thus, while each
reform effected was probably of smaller compass than those undertaken by the English committees, the overall result was perhaps more
impressive. Second, at the same time the Law Revision Committee
was formed, a section of the Justice Department which would be
specifically responsible for law reform was set up. Capable lawyers
within the department not only assisted the Committee in its research,
but also initiated reforms through the department itself. Third, the
Minister of Justice or his deputy sat as a member of the Committee.
Presumably he steered the Committee away from areas of reform
which for political reasons would prove fruitless, and he also provided
the Committee with an influential friend in the legislature. Thus,
there was less danger that the Committee's work would go for
nothing because of political opposition. Finally, to the body of
"home-grown" reform 8 were added a number of English reforms
which New Zealand adopted.' 9 Although the introduction of English
15. J.HANAN, supra note 7, at 1-19; Cameron, Law Reform in New Zealand, 32
N.Z.L.J. 72, 88, 106-08 (1956). On the formation of the New Zealand Law Revision
Committee, see Sim, Law Reform in New Zealand, 12 N.Z.L.J. 86 (1936); Law
Revision Committee-The Attorney-General'sInauguralAddress, 13 N.Z.L.J. 224 (1937);
The Law Revision Committee's Work in 1937, 13 N.Z.L.J. 337 (1937). Its recommendations were not published, but its activities were reported briefly and sporadically
in the New Zealand Law Journal.
16. The Committee considered about 250 suggestions, of which some 160 were the
subject of recommendations. The "great majority" of recommendations resulted in
legislation. J. HANAN, supranote 7, at 7.
17. E.g., New Zealand Law Revision Committee-Tenth Meeting, 16 N.Z.L.J. 120
(1940) (procedural code for courts of limited civil jurisdiction); The Law Revision
Committee's Work, 23 N.Z.L.J. 328 (1947) (property legislation; magistrates' courts);
The Work of the Law Revision Committee, 14 N.Z.L.J. 357 (1938) (imperial statutes).
18. See, e.g., Legitimation Act 1939, 7 N.Z. Reprint 847 (legitimation per subsequens
matrimonium); Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, 7 N.Z. Reprint 823
(provision for enforcement of promises to make testamentary benefaction in appropriate
cases); Joint Family Homes Act 1950, 6 N.Z. Reprint 673 (optional protection for
family homes against sale for non-payment of debts and alienation by owner spouse);
Wills Amendment Act 1958, N.Z. Stat. 1958 at 158 (statutory substitution of grandchildren where child of testator predeceases him); Simultaneous Deaths Act 1958,
N.Z. Stat. 1958 at 405 (passing of estate where time of death uncertain); Judicature
Amendment Act 1958, N.Z. Stat. 1958 at 417 (new provisions in respect of money
paid under mistake). Some of these reforms were based on Commonwealth or United
States legislation.
19. E.g., Law Reform Act 1936, 7 N.Z. Reprint 817 (contribution between joint
tortfeasors; capacities and liabilities of married women); Frustrated Contracts Act 1944,
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legislation required some study in order to ensure that it was ap-

propriate under New Zealand circumstances, the fact that it had
already been accepted in England made the way much smoother.
The foregoing comparisons go a long way toward explaining why
the two countries chose different forms of law revision commissions.

In England, the Lord Chancellor, anxious to promote a comprehensive
scheme of law reform, could find little foundation in the existing

institutions on which to build. In New Zealand, on the other hand, a
foundation had already been laid, with the Law Revision Committee
acting as a pivot in the relationship between the profession, the

academic lawyers and the Justice Department.
No doubt improvements could have been effected in the English

machinery of law reform. But even so, would it have met the new
demands being made upon it? Or had the time come for a reap-

praisal of the legal profession's role in law reform? The Lord Chancellor evidently made such a reappraisal, and concluded that the

initiative for reform could no longer rest with the profession alone.
This does not mean that the English profession had failed in its

basic responsibilities. A promoter of law reform is a specialist, just
as a judge or an advocate, and the law cannot hold back the age
of specialization forever. But certain professional attitudes may
have contributed to the decision. English writers have cited well
meaning conservative opposition from within the profession as a
major factor in past delays in legislative reform. ° Perhaps for the

same reason, the tempo of judicial reform has been curiously uneven.2
Connected with this conservatism is the tremendous deference judges

occasionally pay to ancient decisions, at the possible expense of a

consistent structure of modem principle. A striking illustration is
Ministry of Health v. Simpson, in which the following very modem
5 N.Z. Reprint 495; Limitation Act 1950, 8 N.Z. Reprint 393; Judicature Amendment
Act 1952, 6 N.Z. Reprint 741 (interest on unpaid money claims); Defamation Act 1954,
3 N.Z. Reprint 861; Contracts Enforcement Act 1956, 2 N.Z. Reprint 751; Occupiers
Liability Act 1962; Innkeepers Act 1962; Perpetuities Act 1964. In some cases, English
reforms were anticipated in New Zealand. See, e.g., Law Reform Act 1936, 7 N.Z. Reprint 810 (abolition of common employment rule); Trustee Act 1956, 16 N.Z. Reprint 150 (variation of trusts).
20. Chorley & Dworkin, supra note 3, at 677 n.10; Williams 12.
21..Compare, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, [1964] A.C. 465,
where the House of Lords, overruling a previous Court of Appeal decision, made a
far-reaching extension of liability for careless misrepresentation, with Myers v. D.P.P.,
[19651 A.C. 1001, where the same court declined to re-examine the "patchwork quilt"
of the hearsay rule, Lords Pearce and Donovan dissenting. The first decision caused
a much greater adjustment of social interests than a different decision would have in
the second.
22. [1951] A.C. 251, aff'g Diplock v. Wintle, [1948] 1 Ch. 465 (C.A.), reo'g
[1947] 1 Ch. 716. Lord Simonds, at 268, attributed the error of the court at first
instance to counsel's failure to draw its attention to seventeenth and eighteenth century decisions.
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problem arose: A trustee paid trust money to someone not entitled
to it, under a mistake of law, and was subsequently relieved of responsibility to the beneficiaries under a trustee relief statute. Can the

beneficiaries recover the money from the payee? The court solved the
problem largely by reference to seventeenth century decisions on

waste. Most serious of all, English courts have been criticized for
paying too little attention to decisions of courts in the Commonwealth

and the United States.23

Can the lawyer shake off these habits of thought when he begins

to deliberate law reform? There are indications that this was too
much to expect even of the eminent members of the reform com-

mittees.24 However, for obvious reasons, these attitudes cannot be
permitted to intrude into a large scale program for law reform. This
consideration may have led the Lord Chancellor to the view that a

law commission should infuse new values into law reform, leading
professional thought rather than following it. Certainly, the follow-

ing examination of the structure of the Commission can leave little
doubt that this is to be its role.
II. Tim SmRucruRE AND PRocEDuRs OF TIM CoM ISSION
The predominant feature of the English Law Commission, which
sets it apart from the more traditional law reform agencies, is its
almost complete insulation from any kind of external control. Its
independence of the government, the legislature, and even, to some
extent, the Lord Chancellor is secured by a constitution laid down
by Act of Parliament.2 Its freedom to transcend ordinary professional
23. Wade, supra note 9, at 9; see Informed Opinions, 37 AusTL. L.J. 137 (1963).
But cf. Informed Opinions, 38 AusmL. L.J. 186 (1964). On the other hand, the Nev
Zealand profession has been taken to task for its undue reliance on overseas precedent,

especially English, without adapting it to local circumstances. Cameron, supra note- 15,
at 73-74.
24. On the small degree to which overseas material was used in law reform, see
Wade, supra note 9, at 8-9. He cites as an extreme instance the Porter Committee
on Defamation, which "dismissed the voluminous study of the law of libel throughout
the Commonwealth and the United States which was prepared for them by Dr. Glanville Williams and the late Sir Percy Winfield respectively with a bare sentence."
CoMsIrTTE oN mH LAw oF DEFAMATI N, IEPORT, Cm:. No. 7536 (1948), especially
1 3. Charges of conservatism and preoccupation with historical matters would be
more difficult to support. It is true, however, that the Law Reform Committee in
some of its earlier reports tended to prefer to stay with old conceptions when perhaps
a more radical approach was called for. See LAw REFoRm COMNcTE, SEcoND REPoRT,
Cam. No. 9161 (1954)

(innkeepers' liability); LAw RFoRM Cox varTEE, Fouras RE-

CmD. No. 18 (1956) (rule against perpetuities). There is also extensive discussion of history in many of the reports of both the Law Reform Committee and
the Law Revision Committee. Furthermore, the committees seemed to have a cautious
policy in selecting topics, preferring matters that have already aroused much professional dissatisfaction. Professor Goodhart defends such a policy. See Coodhart, supra
note 2, at 13.
25. Law Commissions Act 1965, c. 22.
PoRT,

1016

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

LVOL. 20

values is attained by the abandonment of the principle that a law
reform body should be representative of the various branches of the
legal profession.26 Thus, the Commission is designed as a small,
closely knit striking force whose object will be to inject new life into
English law reform.
A closer examination of the constitution and procedures of the
Commission shows how tightly the control of law reform is held by
the Commission, to the exclusion of any political influence. It is
actively involved in every stage of preparation of the reforms which
will eventually be presented to Parliament for passage as legislation.
As a body, it decides on a general program of law reform, and then,
subject to the approval of the Lord Chancellor, begins work on
specific projects within that program. One of its members then
heads a group of research assistants who make the initial investigation
of the project. If working parties are formed to make more comprehensive enquiries, a member of the Commission will be its chairman,
though the legal profession and interested government departments
will be represented on the working parties. A report will then be
made back to the Commission, whose final report on the proposed
reform will be presented to the Lord Chancellor.21 The staff employed
by the Commission includes not only research assistants, but also
statutory draftsmen responsible for the preparation of reform bills.28
Thus, the entire process of bringing reform to the door of the legislature is in the hands of the Commission, subject only to initial reference
to the Lord Chancellor, whose many other duties will no doubt prevent his making any active surveillance of the Commission's activities 9
A corollary of this policy of freeing the Commission of political
or governmental dependence, was the decision not to include any
cabinet representative on the Commission. In his initial, unofficial
proposals before his appointment as Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner
had proposed that the president of the Commission should be chosen
from the House of Commons, be styled "Vice-Chancellor" and have
the rank of Minister of State, with his entire responsibility being that
of law reform.30 But in the Law Commissions Act, this part of the
design was not included, presumably because of its inconsistency
with the Commission's independent status. This decision is a some26. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
27. Law Commissions Act 1965, c. 22, § 3; LAW Co' I'N

FIRST ANN. REP, 1965-

1966, 111
7-13, 28-30, app. I (1966).
28. LAw CoN-m' FrST ANN. REP. 1965-1966, 11110-11 (1966). The Commission
then had a staff of 35, comprising the Secretary, four draftsmen, nine other lawyers and
twenty-one non-legal members.
29. Gardiner & Martin 8; Williams 13-14.
30. Gardiner & Martin 8.
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what debatable feature of the structure of the Commission, because
the experience of law reform agencies in which political figures have
played a part in their deliberations seems to indicate that their
presence is valuable.3 1 If reforms are to be effected through legislation, it is very important that some member of the legislature, preferably an influential one, be prepared to identify himself with the
reform and to speak on its behalf. Moreover, some reforms, however
desirable, are just not politically feasible; if the reform agency wants
to avoid undertaking work which will not produce results, it will find
the advice of someone with political experience extremely helpful.
On the other hand, the English profession has always tended to
resist political involvement in law reform for fear that it might lead
to political interference with the general administration of law.'
This fear, however, appears exaggerated, and certainly the experience
in New York and New Zealand, 33 where such political involvement
exists, gives it no basis whatsoever. Perhaps a more real apprehension
is that a representative of the government or the legislature might
tend to steer the Commission away from any area of reform where
the political consequences would be uncertain, with the result that
very unsatisfactory parts of the law would not be dealt with at
all. But this seems to be a matter in which one would have to rely
on the good sense of the Commission as a whole, as is so often the case.
Turning now to the question of the relationship of the Commission
to the legal profession, this question centered around the selection of
the members of the Commission themselves. How many should there
be, and on what principles should they be appointed? It was decided
that the Commission should be small, expert and non-representative.
There are five commissioners, including the chairman. No restrictions
are placed on how the Commission should be made up, except that
each member must be "suitably qualified by the holding of judicial
office or by experience as a barrister or solicitor or as a teacher of
law in a university."M The appointments actually made re-emphasised
the advent of a new philosophy of reform. Of the appointees, one
(the chairman) was a judge, one a retired barrister, and no less than
three were what could properly be described as "academic lawyers"
although two of them had professional experience.3 An interesting
31. J.HANAN, supra note 7, at 16; Heineman, supra note 3, at 718. For a recent
plea for more governmental involvement in law reform, see Winters, A Ministry of
Justice: The Time to Act is Now, 48 J. Am. Junic. Soc'y 206 (1965).
32. Chorley & Dworkin, supra note 3, at 679 n.22; Williams 12.
33. N.Z. DEi"T oF JusTicE ANN. REP. 1960-61 at 6 (1961); MacDonald, supra
note 3, at 10, n.44.
34. Law Commissions Act 1965, c. 22, §§ 1, 3.
35. Chorley & Dworkin, supra note 3, at 686. The members of the Commission are
there described as follows: Mr. Justice Scarman, a High Court Judge assigned to
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division; Mr. Neil Lawson, Q.C., a retired bar-
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feature of the appointments, in view of the suggestion made in the
previous part that English practitioners do not refer to decisions of
courts outside their own jurisdiction, was the fact that two of the new
commissioners were experts in comparative law. Inevitably, the appointments aroused controversy, the details of which are recounted
elsewhere 6 But the crucial fact was that the old Law Reform Committee, which had been solidly representative of the legal profession,
was now replaced by a small group of men whose views were likely
to be well in advance of those generally held in the profession.37
This development brought with it a major problem. By what
means could the profession be persuaded to support the Commission's
proposal for law reform, since they would be based on more liberal
values than those of the majority of practitioners? Any substantial
opposition from that quarter would mean that a particular reform
opposed would almost certainly be stalled, and possibly doomed.
Techniques had to be devised whereby objections to the reform
could be met at an early stage, and the reform modified if necessary.
Moreover, the profession still had a role to play in reform. The
difficulty was how to give it as large a part in the process as possible,
without compromising the fundamental objective of speeding up the
rate of achievement.
The techniques adopted by the Commission deserve close attention,
as they are both novel and skillfully conceived. In the first place,
while the Commission draws up its own program of reform, it does so
on the basis of the many proposals it invites and receives from the
profession, from law teachers, from government departments and from
the lay public.-3 Second, it undertakes a great deal of consultation
rister; Professor L.C.B. Cower, a solicitor who "has spent the previous seventeen years
mainly in academic work, the last three in Nigeria;" Mr. N. S. Marsh, the Director of
the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, and previously an Oxford
don; and Professor Andrew Martin, Q.C., Professor of International and Comparative
Law at the University of Southampton and a practising barrister. The last named was
a co-editor of LAw REFoRma Now, supra note 4.
36. Chorley &Dworkin, supra note 3, at 684-87.
37. Cf. supra note 13. It should be noted that a further danger with a representative law reform agency is that it may tend to avoid controversial issues, because it
feels it cannot resolve conflicting points of view. Occasional examples of declining to
meet issues are to be found in the record of the New Zealand Law Revision Committee. See its handling of liability for livestock wandering on the roads, Law Revision
Committee Tenth Meeting, 16 N.Z.L.J. 120, 121 (1940), and Law Revision Committee
Twelfth Meeting, 21 N.Z.LJ. 233 (1945); admissibility of records in criminal cases,
Law Revision Committee Forty-Fifth Meeting, [1962] N.Z.L.J. 350 (But see the Evidence Amendment Act 1966); and absolute liability for motor accidents, Law Revision
Committee Forty-Fifth Meeting, [1962) N.Z.L.J. 350; Law Revision Committee Fiftieth
Meeting, [1965] N.Z.L.J. 63, and the totally inconclusive REPonT OF TnE Coinr
mxriE
ox AnsoLxur Lmn..mrry (1963). Such a tendency, however, has not been cited as a
serious problem in New Zealand's program of law reform.
, 38. LAw CoiDx'r FmsT ANat. REP. 1965-1966 1111127-30 (1966). At that stage, 632
law reform proposals had been received. The sources were: legal profession (including
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with members of the profession. It has a Special Consultant who is a
solicitor, and whose function is to present the views of that branch
of the profession to the Commission. He spends a great amount of
time with the commissioners, and gives them valuable assistance.m
Arrangements have been made through the various professional societies for informal consultations whenever the Commission feels the
need for them.40 Finally, where a matter is large and controversial,
working parties have been set up, consisting of members of the
Commission, practicing lawyers and members of interested organisations. 41 The function of these groups is to investigate possible opposition to the proposed reform, either informally or by way of public
hearing. Of course, the question still remains, will these devices be
sufficient? As yet, it is much too early to assess their efficacy.
One technique for assuring professional acceptance for reform
seems to have been overlooked. It is the promotion of certain reforms,
not through legislation, but through judicial decision. By addressing
reports to the judiciary, the Commission could give the courts the
first opportunity to put a misconceived rule of law aright. The
report would bring much more relevant information to the court's
attention than would normally be possible in an adversary hearing,
and in a more impartial manner. If the court were to accept the
Commission's reasoning, and apply it in its decisions, then conservative opposition would lose much of its force.
This suggested technique would have other advantages as well.
Some legal doctrines are best developed step by step, rather than
delineated once and for all in a statute. One example, considered by
the New York Law Revision Commission, was the rule that an
infant had no right to claim damages for injuries suffered while
en ventre sa mere, as a consequence of negligent conduct towards the
mother.42 The Commission refused to recommend legislation, feeling
that the matter was best left to judicial correction, which in fact
professional associations, law teachers and lawyers in government departments), 58%;
individual members of the public, 24%; non-legal organizations, 8%; found in the
legal and lay press, 10%. Of these proposals, 38% were made part of the immediate
program of reform, 40% deferred for later consideration, 17% referred to Government
departments. On the remaining 5%, the Commission found no action could appropriately
be taken. Compare the lack of public response to the activities of the Law Reform
Committee discussed by Wade, supra note 9, at 4-5.
39. LAW Com'N Frst ANN. REP. 1965-1966

118.

See Chorley & Dworkin, supra

note 3, at 686-87.
40. LA w CoM'N Fmrst ANN. REP. 1965-1966 11 22-23. Cf. Hollands, The Work
of the Committee to Co-operate with the Law Re6ision Commission, 37 N.Y.S.B.J. 58
(1965) (account of situation in New York).
41. LA-,w Comn FIRST ANN. REP. 1965-1966 firi 36-38, 67, 73, 90, app. . Working
parties have been formed to deal -with exemption clauses in contracts, codification of
the law of landlord and tenant, restrictive covenants in transfers of land and recognition
of foreign decrees of divorce and legal separation.
42. Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, 191 N.Y.S. 220 (1921).
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happened. 3 This approach nearly had spectacular consequences
recently, when the New York Court of Claims allowed a plaintiff
to claim damages in respect of the defendant's negligently allowing
intercourse between the plaintiff's mother and a third person, resulting
in the plaintiff's conception and birth without proper family status.
A statute would have been most unlikely to cover such a contingency,
but would probably have prevented the court from extending the
common law to meet the situation. On appeal, however, the Court
of Claims' decision was reversed.44
Of course, not every reform can be promoted through the courts.
Some require a precision of statement, or a refined regulatory technique, which only a statute can give them. But where this method
is available, it is a useful alternative, especially in view of the many
difficulties involved in legislative reform. The pressure on parliamentary time, resulting in a bottleneck at which reform bills seem the
most likely to suffer, was much discussed when the English Commission was established, but nothing was done about it.45 The fact
that a new principle of law must, when embodied in a statute, be
expressed in precise terminology, may distort the philosophy behind
the new rules, and subject the reform to the additional and complicated process of statutory interpretation. 46 All these considerations
suggest that reform through judicial decision should not too hastily be
dismissed as impracticable.
What conclusions are to be drawn from an examination of the
structure and procedures of the Law Commission? It seems that
the sponsors of the Commission were successful in their objective,
to create a law reform agency capable of marching ahead of professional opinion. But this success may have its price, because of
the Commission's basic lack of liaison with the profession and the
43. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); N.Y. LAW REVISION
To PnE-NATAL INJUnIEs,
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 60H (1935); Fuld, The Commission and the Courts, 40 COnNELL
L.Q. 646, 657-58 (1955).
44. Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), sev'd, 18
N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966). On the general problem of
analogising from legislation, see Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50
Hnv. L. REv. 4 (1936).
45. Chorley & Dworkin, supra note 3, at 682; Devlin, The Process of Law Reform,
63 LAw Soc. GAZ. 453 (1956). See generally Hutton, Mechanics of Law Reform, 24
MOD. L. REv. 18 (1961); MacDonald, Legal Research Translated into Legislative
Action, 48 ConHm.iL L.Q. 401 (1963).
46. The English techniques of statutory interpretation are under consideration by
the Law Commission. LAw Conm'N Frost ANxr. REP. 1965-1966 UU 107-12 (1966).
No doubt the use of the legislative history in interpreting a statute will be closely
considered, see Gardiner & Martin 13. New techniques of drafting may also help.
The Law. Reform Committee tried a statutory "statement of principle" in the Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, §§ 1, 2 (1957). LAw RE1roRm CoMMurrE_,
TrnaD REPOnT, Czam. No. 9305 (1954).
CO='N, COMMNICATION TO THE LEcIsLATURE RELATc
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government. If the price is paid in terms of a mounting collection of
recommendations for reform which can command neither judicial nor
legislative acceptance, then the Commission's independence will be
costly indeed. If, on the other hand, it can solve these problems,
by means of a judiciously chosen program of reform and the use of
such techniques as have been described to overcome the friction
caused by its activities, then its prospects of achievement are
extremely bright.
It is instructive to return briefly to the position in New Zealand,
where presumably the risks entailed in a commission of the English
style were thought to be too great when compared with the advantages to be gained. 47 As a consequence, all the points which have
so far been considered concerning the structure of the English Commission were decided differently in New Zealand. The Law Revision
Commission was given only one part of the process of law reform; its
function is to "map out territory, to decide priorities; to allocate particular items to standing committees, special committees or other bodies,
and to review progress annually."48 The tasks of investigation and research were given to standing and special committees, who report
directly to the Minister of Justice.49 The Minister of Justice himself
continues to occupy a key position in the machinery of law reform. He
is a member of the Commission, and his staff in the Justice Department
provides the only lawyers available to work full-time on projects set
in motion by the Commission.5 0 The Commission, like its predecessor,
is representative, drawing its members from the profession, the university law schools, the Department of Justice and the legislature. 5 ' It
has no formal constitution, because the Minister of Justice felt that
supra note 7, at 18-19. The defects in New Zealand's previous
47. See J. IIANx,
program of reform with which he was concerned were: (1) the lack of an adequately
qualified full-time staff, coupled with the fact that the members of the Law Revision
Committee had insufficient time available; (2) the tendency to wait until a particular
reform was accepted in England before promoting similar legislation; (3) the tendency
to deal only with known anomalies in the law, and not to look for injustices before
they happened. Id. at 20-21.
48. Id. at 23.
49. Id. at 22-24.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id. at 23. In 1965, the Law Revision Committee had sixteen members. They
were the Minister of Justice (chairman), four representatives of the New Zealand Law
Society, one representative from each of the four university law schools, the Chairman
of the Statutes Revision Committee in Parliament, one nominee of the Parliamentary
Opposition, the Solicitor-General, the Law Draftsman, the Secretary for Justice and
two members appointed in their personal capacity. Id. at 10. The judiciary had expressed early interest, but their representative was not able to sit with the Committee,
and membership was not continued. Cameron, supra note 15, at 106 n.39. Surprisingly.
enough, this large committee began with only seven members. Mason, Law RevisioiT
Committee, 13 N.Z.L'.J. 224 '(1937); The Law Revision Committee's Work in 1937,
13 N.Z.L.J. 337 (1937).
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it was "better to be free to modify and alter in the light 52
of experience
or as the circumstances at any particular time dictate."
This comparison shows how two very different conceptions of a law
reform agency can share the name "Law Commission." It also illustrates the great extent to which the English Commission has departed
from traditional thinking in its structure. It is still much too early to
assess the impact which the new philosophy will have on law reform.
But some effects can already be seen in the program of reform the
Commission has drawn up.
III. THE

PROGRAM OF REFORM

The role the Law Commission has assumed, and made explicit
in its first program of reform, is the clearest evidence of all of the
break which has occurred with the past. The program is more
ambitious than anything hitherto undertaken by a law reform agency,
either in the Commonwealth or the United States. No longer will
reform proceed on a piecemeal basis. Instead, whole areas of law
will be reconstructed, and put into a form in which it will be readily
accessible to both the lawyer and the layman. Ultimately, all the
law will be
work of the Commission in renovation of the private
53
brought together to make up a Code of Obligations.
It would be inappropriate, when discussing so large a conception, to
concern oneself unduly with the specific projects the Commission has
undertaken. Each country has its own problem areas of law which
will receive priority when a program of reform is drawn up. Instead,
this part of the article will be concerned with three major policy
questions which must be confronted by a law reform agency in
drawing up such a program: (1) Should it consciously avoid matters
which are likely to be controversial because of their social or political
implications? (2) Should it undertake overall studies of broad areas
of law, or should it confine its work to the reform of specific unsatis52. J. HAN.N, supra note 7, at 25.
53. LAiw CoNfe'N FrosT ANN. REP. 1965-1966, pt. II (1966). For published recom-

mendations,

see LAw COMMiSSION, LANDLORD AND TENANT: INTERIM REPORT ON
DxisTEss FOR RENT (1966); LAW CONMISSION, REFORMf OF TE GROUNDS OF DivoRcE:
THE Fm.D OF CHaOICE, CmD. No. 3123 (1966); LAw ConmussION, PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM OF TE LAW RELATING TO MAInTENANCE AND CImSITry (1966); LAW ComrMISSION, PROPOSALS TO ABOLISH CERTAIN ANCIENT CmIMINAL OFFENCES

(1966);

LAW

PowERs OF APPEAL CouRTs, C~m. No. 3145 (1966);
CoMMIssIoN, REPORT ON =
LAW CozMMssIoN, IMPUTED CRIMNAL INTENT (1967); LAW COMISSION, TRANsFER
OF LAND: INTmuM REPORT ON ROOT OF TrLE TO LAND (1967). There is insufficient
published material on the New Zealand Law Revision Commission's proposals to make
any detailed comparison at this point. The Commission has approved "the commencement of work on what is undoubtedly the broadest and most far-reaching programme
of law reform in [New Zealand's] history." N.Z. DEP'T OF JusTIcE ANN. REP. 1965-66
at 18 (1966). See J. HAi-AN, supra note 7, at 26-28, for an indication of its possible
scope.
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factory rules of law? (3) Should it have as its ultimate aim the
restatement or codification of the whole of private law, or is it better
merely to try to achieve improvements in the existing amalgam of
common law and statute? In the answers given by the English Commission to these questions, the Commission has shown that it takes
the very broadest view of its functions.
Taking the first question, it has never been altogether clear what
is meant when law reform agencies are warned against making recommendations on "controversial," "political" or "social" issues. If these
terms are intended to connote proposed reforms which would affect
established interests, then the warning has little force, because few
reforms simply smooth out a situation, leaving no one worse off than
he was before. Of course, in some cases those adversely affected
are in a much better position to voice opposition to the reform, and
to bring pressure to bear to prevent its becoming law. But to put
the distinction on that basis would seem to imply a judgment, not
about a principle, but about political tactics.M The same is true of
other issues that might be thought to come within the warning, such as
the censure of a government department for failure to observe the
rule of law,55 or the discussion of matters concerned with morals and
close family relationships. Whatever substance the warning may
have, it has clearly been disregarded by the Commission, whose early
reports include a recommendation to abolish distress for rent without
56 and a
leave of the court despite vigorous opposition from landlords,
57
divorce.
of
grounds
new
for
proposals
on
commentary
It is plain that an independent Commission, basing itself on
reason, research and an ordinary sense of decency, has much to
contribute to the discussion of a "controversial" issue. It can outline
the basic criteria that must be met before a proposed rule of law
will operate satisfactorily, and recommend the rejection or re-examination of those proposals which do not meet them. It can clarify
the arguments put forward by the disputing sides, and verify the
factual assertions that have been advanced in support of them. It can
supply an impartial account of the history of the existing legal position, which a long and heated debate may have obscured. In theory
54. See MacDonald, supra note 3, at 15; MacDonald, Foreword to Symposium on
the New York Law Revision Commission, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 641, 644 (1955); Scarman,
supra note 6, at 18-19.
55. See J. HANAN, supra note 7, at 24. He thought a law commission should include departmental activities within its purview.
56. LAw ConmissiON, LANDLORD AND TENANT: Ir-ERIM REPORT ON DISTRESS FOR
RENT (1966).
57. LAw Coianssiow, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIvoRcE: THE FIELD OF
CIorcE, CmD. No. 3123 (1966).
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at least, it can do all these things without trespassing on the final
judgment of the substantial issues involved.5
There is, however, a cost to be paid for the Law Commission's
participation in such discussions. It must inevitably find itself tending to reject certain proposals and to support others. For example,
anyone reading the Law Commission's report on the grounds of
divorce could be left in little doubt that it favored only one solution,
namely, the introduction of divorce based on two years separation
of the parties to the marriage.5 9 Despite protestations that the Commission acts in such matters on purely technical or lawyerly grounds,
to all outward appearances it becomes an aligned party. If the
Commission consistently takes such positions, might not its image as
an impartial law reform agency be affected? The fact that its reports
are to be found at the center of a stormy public debate, could encourage others to attack its other recommendations on matters in
which it is fighting to overcome conservative opposition. The Commission's boldness could thus lead to a general weakening of its
authority.
This is a matter, therefore, in which the Commission will have to
exercise great circumspection. It will be virtually forced to enter
some controversies, because they intimately affect its own plan of
reform. The report on the grounds of divorce was an example; the
reform of family law is one of its first projects. But there will be
other issues in which, although the Commission may feel it has much
to contribute, it is better not to intervene. This judgment will always
be a difficult one, and much will depend on how well it is made.
The second major policy issue is whether a law reform agency
should proceed by way of broad studies of particular areas of law,
or by introducing small reforms to take care of specific rules which
are not working satisfactorily. The Law Commission has chosen the
former alternative.60 Thus it seeks to deal with one of the most
pervasive problems of law reform-how to avoid a confused patchwork
58. Cf. Scarman, supra note 6, at 19.
59. Supra note 57, at II 120. See Kahn-Freund, The Law Commission: Reform on
the Grounds of Divorce, 30 MOD. L. REv. 180 (1967). At 11156-70, the Commission
rejected as impractical certain proposals put forward by a group appointed by the
Archbishop of Canterbury. Those proposals would have required a court to investigate
whether a marriage had in fact broken down, before decreeing a divorce. Conv. or
ARcHmisHoP or CA rNqTusy, PtrrrnsG AsuNDER: A DIvoRcE LAW ror CONTEn'ORARY
Socr-rr (1966), noted in Irvine, Report of the Mortimer Group on Divorce Law, 30
MOD. L. REv. 72 n.1 (1967).
60. LAW Cownd'N Fmrst ANN. REP. 1965-1966, pt. II (1966). Topics for investi-

gation include such broad items as "Consideration, Third Party Rights in Contract
40-42), "Civil Liability for Dangerous Things and
and Contracts Under Seal" (1111
Activities" (MrlI 43-45), "Personal Injury Litigation" (fff[ 50-57) and "Transfer of
Land" ( 111 68-76).
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of amendment, without guiding principles or overall direction.6 1 There
are also practical advantages in the course taken. It is easier to see
the real problem that a rule was meant to solve, when it is taken in
a wider context. A solution can be devised which will not create
anomalies of its own.62 By comparison, the amendment or removal of
a single rule of law may be only a palliative action, which fails to
deal with the basic difficulty, and indeed may hinder the eventual
adoption of the appropriate measures.0
While there is much to be said for undertaking broad studies,
however, drawbacks do exist. Much more work is required before
such a study is presented, and this may mean that urgently needed
reforms may be delayed. For example, in its interim report on
Distress for Rent, the Commission considered that distress before
judgment is seldom used and is "unattractive to contemporary

society." 64 It declined to make any definite recommendation, though,

because it saw the problem as part of a much larger issue, the
general question of how the courts ought to enforce the payment
of debts. This latter question will no doubt require prolonged
enquiries. Moreover, when a large study does come, it may be
much more difficult to get its recommendations accepted. The very
fact that it deals with more fundamental alterations in the law will
provoke opposition, because not everyone will agree that radical
change is necessary. What is more, one controversial recommendation
in the study may bring the whole reform to a halt, even though the
other proposals taken by themselves are generally acceptable. Here
too the Commission will have to exercise great skill and discretion
if it is to succeed in its objectives.
Finally, there is the question of the Code of Obligations. The
65
Law Commission has dedicated itself to this ultimate achievement.
61. Cameron, supra note 15, at 106-08; Gardiner & Martin 6.
62, See, e.g., New Zealand's Judicature Amendment Act 1958, N.Z. Stat. 1958 at
417, § 94A; Sutton, Mistake of Law-Lifting the Lid of Pandora'sBox, in A. G. DAvis,
EssAYs 3N LA-,W 218 (J. Northey ed. 1965). The section removed the old rule that
money paid under mistake of law could not be recovered, but left untouched such
allied questions as what happens when services are rendered under mistake of law,

or a contract is entered into under a similar mistake.
63. See Cameron, supra note 15, at 107. He suggested that, in some cases, smaller
measures, by removing the agitation for reform without dealing with its cause,'had
delayed the introduction of the necessary larger legislation.
64. LAw CoM.MnssIoN, LANDLORD AND TENANT: INTEnim REPORT ON Disnss

"FOR

RE=r f11123-26 (1966). Compare the New York Law Revision Commission, whose sole
venture into large-scale reform meant three years devoted to little else. See Braucher,
The Commission and the Law of Contracts, 40 Cos, nr.NLL.Q. 696, 714-17 (1955);
MacDonald, supra note 3, at 12, 16.
31-34,'67, 78-85. See Walker,
65. LAW Com'N FmRST ANN. R 1. 1965-1966 at 1111
Reform, Restatement and the Law Commissions, [19651 JnrD. REV. 245. Work has
already started on codes of the general law of contract, laiidl6id and tenant and, 'in a
more preparatory way, family law.
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Should a law reform agency include as part of its program, the
rewriting of the common law, with a view to its formal enactment as
the fundamental law? The work would involve serious problems.
Suitable words must be found to embody the philosophy as well as the
letter of the common law rules. Room must be left for the Code to
expand in many directions under judicial hand. Appropriate techniques for interpretation of the Code must be devised and made
acceptable to the courts. Whether the end product of all this work
would in fact operate more satisfactorily than the existing amalgam of
decisional and statutory law is at least debatable. It would therefore
seem more rational for a law reform agency to concentrate on improving the law, rather than
diverting its efforts in rewriting law
66
which already works well.
Nevertheless, special considerations may have influenced the
English Law Commission in its decision to codify the law. The
enunciation of a code could play a major part in attaining the
Commission's objectives of infusing new values in law reform, and
leading professional opinion to a point where it accepts radical
change. It would provoke a great deal of discussion among the lay
public, particularly those affected by the rules, and this is the
opinion which the Commission is anxious to hear.67 While no one
believes that the detailed rules of law can be readily understood by
the layman, the basic principles on which they are founded ought to
be made available to him, because they belong to him and not
exclusively to the lawyers.68 Codification would also imply a rejection
of historical details and ancient decisions as a proper source of law,
a rejection from which lawyers and laymen would benefit, at least
in the view of the sponsors of the Law Commission. 69 Thus the Code
of Obligations may be seen as one of the direct implications of the
new philosophy of law reform.
The Law Commission's policy on these three issues has added new
dimensions to the functions of a law reform agency. Of course,
there has always been a need for impartial advice on controversial
issues, for probing enquiries into the fundamental bases of large
areas of law, and for restatements of law which will make it more
66. Limited codes on special relationships, contracts or types of property, such as
partnership, sales of goods or copyright, are, of course, an established part of AngloAmerican law. The creation of such codes, however, has usually been undertaken by
special ad hoe bodies, rather than the regular law reform agencies. See Wade, supra
note 9, app. pt. 2, cf., MacDonald, supranote 3, at 16.
67. LAw CommnssxoN, Fmsr PROGRAMME fr 3 (1966); LAW CoMzi'N FnST ANN.
REP. 1965-1966 at f111137-38 (1966). For an interesting study of the fundamental
values laymen have brought to law reform, see Dowrick, Laymen's Values for Law
Reform, 82 L.Q.R. 497 (1966).
68. Scarman, supra note 6, at 12-13.
69. Gardiner & Martin, 10-12; of. Williams, 15-21.
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easily available both to the lawyer and, to a more limited extent, to
the layman. But hitherto these needs have been met by the appointment of ad hoc commissions, or simply left to the enterprise of textwriters and contributors to legal periodicals. The relationship of this
work with the processes of law reform has now been recognised, and
the law reform agency's functions have been correspondingly enlarged.
IV. CONCLUSION

What conclusions are to be drawn from this enquiry into the
structure and functions of the English Law Commission? In particular, what relevance does it have for those interested in law reform
in other countries? The implications of its new philosophy of law
reform, and the import of this article, may be summarised in the
form of two questions.
First, has a conscious effort been made to adapt the machinery of
law reform to the peculiar needs of each state and country? The
outstanding success of the New York Law Revision Commission, in
particular, may have obscured the fact that there are a variety of
structures of law reform agency from which sponsors of law reform
may choose. What is suitable in one state may be inappropriate in
another. An assessment must be made of the general state of its law,
the previous pace of law reform, and professional attitudes towards
it. Moreover, these matters must be constantly reassessed to keep
pace with growing demands and aspirations in law reform.
Second, have we been too conservative in what we think a law
commission can achieve? Have we been too ready to circumscribe
its activities with arbitrary boundaries? Many observers will no
doubt have misgivings about the possible costs entailed in an adventurous policy of reform, particularly if payment is to be made at the
point where the price is highest, namely when proposed reforms are
being translated into law and may fail because of sectional opposition.
But a conservative policy also has its costs. Large areas of law may
remain untouched, and such reforms as are proposed may be insufficient to solve the real problems with which they should deal.
The English Law Commission is a new attempt to come to grips
with these questions. Its progress will be closely followed in other
common law countries and no doubt will be widely emulated if it is
successful. But even if it is less successful than its proponents hope,
it nevertheless represents a stimulating new idea in law reform. As
long as there is the courage to put such ideas into practice, law
reform will not stagnate.

